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Summary
The central aim of this paper is to review the current understanding of how
institutional arrangements can either encourage or discourage the pursuit of
sustainable livelihoods.  It explores the relationship between resources and capital,
examining the nature of property rights and regimes, looking at the ways in which
social exclusion affects the pursuit of sustainable livelihoods, and critiquing Common
Pool Resource (CPR) theory.  It concludes that socially shared rules can encourage
sustainable livelihoods provided the rate at which individuals extract benefits from the
resource base remains relatively low, and distribution of benefits remains wide.
However, when such rules reinforce more narrow distributional patterns, livelihoods
can be profoundly unsustainable, irrespective of the physical state of the resource
base.
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3I. Introduction
Concerns about environmental degradation have stimulated new thinking
about the ways in which social arrangements affect the use and distribution of natural
resources. Challenging gloomier predictions about human-environment interaction,
institutional theories suggest that human societies can avert a tragedy of the commons,
if they devise and adhere to the right set of rules.3 Although rules provide order,
however, they do not necessarily provide well-being. To the extent that they dictate
social behaviour, rules influence the ways in which individuals pursue a secure and
sustainable livelihood. In so doing, they set the parameters within which individuals,
and groups of individuals, prepare for and respond to the effects of environmental
change.
Social institutions, the rules that individuals share and use to regulate
collective behaviour, represent both an obstacle to and an opportunity for the pursuit
of sustainable livelihoods (Mearns, 1996b: 2). In the sense that they facilitate
collective action, institutions enable individuals to transcend the limitations of acting
in isolation. To the extent that they encourage conformity, however, institutions also
maintain and reproduce the status quo, often perpetuating adversity (Goetz, 1996: 10;
Berry, 1989: 50; Bates, 1989: 6-9; 1995: 29-47; Kabeer and Subrahmanian, 1996;
Kabeer and Murthy, 1996; Kabeer and Subrahmanian, 1996: 17; Agrawal, 1994: 268;
Gore, 1993: 452).
A central aim of this paper is to review the current understanding of
institutions and to shed some light on the ways in which institutional arrangements
can encourage or discourage the pursuit of sustainable livelihoods. The text is divided
into six sections. The Section II explores the relationship between resources and
capital, conceptualising the principal elements that constitute a sustainable livelihood.
Section III focuses on the nature of property rights and regimes, examining the ways
in which social exclusion affects the pursuit of sustainable livelihoods. Section IV
considers the ways in which institutions, norms and sanctions encourage or
discourage particular forms of behaviour. Section V examines and critiques Common
Pool Resource (CPR) theory. The final section concludes the paper by developing
propositions about the conditions under which individuals are able to maintain secure
and sustainable livelihoods.
                                                
3See E.Ostrom (1996; 1995; 1990); Keohane and Ostrom (1995); E.Ostrom et al (1993; 1994);
Blomquist (1994); Blomquist et al (1994); Agrawal (1994); Lam (1996); Tang (1994); Libecap (1995);
Blaikie and Brookfield (1987); Martin (1995); Mitchell (1995); Opschoor and van der Straaten (1992);
Swift (1994; 1993); Wade (1988a; 1988b; 1992; 1995); White and Runge (1995); Mearns (1996a;
1996b; 1995); Scoones (1996); Bromley (1992); Runge (1992).
4II. Sustainable Livelihoods
At a very basic level, sustainable livelihoods are about the ways in which
individuals, and  collectivities of individuals, use resources in order to survive. A
resource here implies a good or service which individuals use to pursue, and ideally
satisfy, their interests.4 Resources can be divided into two general categories: natural
and social. Natural resources are the physical inputs which generate value and
productivity in people’s lives. Examples here would include rainfall, soil, sunlight and
temperature. Social resources are the social institutions and relationships that facilitate
this process (Coleman, 1990: 300-2).
Capital and resources are productive in the sense that they both facilitate ends
which would not be attainable in their absence (Coleman, 1990: 302). Like resources,
capital can generate value and productivity for those who have it at their disposal.5 Its
value, however, is defined in terms of its potential. Capital can be accumulated and
transferred, but once it is used for a specific purpose, it becomes a resource. A useful
analogy between capital and resources is the distinction between money in the bank
and money which is used to purchase particular goods and services. Social and natural
capital, then, represent stocks of relationships and physical inputs which, when
exploited, become resources.6
Along with social and natural capital, there are two other important categories:
human and economic capital (Coleman, 1990: 297-300; Gaventa,7 1996). Human
capital refers to the skills, knowledge and intelligence that an individual holds at any
point in his or her lifetime (Coleman, 1990: 297-300). Skills and knowledge can be
built upon by broadening one’s social relationships, or investing economic capital (see
below), or re-investing human capital (e.g. reading a book). They can also be depleted
with disuse (i.e. forgetting the name of an acquaintance or forgetting a particular skill)
and with overuse (i.e. trying to make a decision under stress). Whether intelligence
can be improved or depleted is well beyond the scope of this paper (and the
                                                
4A central assumption here is that individuals pursue interests in a rational manner. Unless otherwise
stated, “rationality” simply implies that one can identify one’s interests and pursue them with intent
and purpose. This should not be confused with self-interested rationality, which assumes that
individuals act in order to maximise their own utility. Instead, this conceptualisation assumes that
individuals seek to maximise their ‘well-being’ (“the type of life one leads, what one can do and can
be,” Gore, 1993: 440), and that of those towards whom they are altruistic.
5Suggesting that capital can be divisible. This idea is explored in greater detail below.
6The relationship between these two forms of capital is explored in greater detail below. For the time
being, these broad definitions will serve to clarify the ways in which institutions relate to the pursuit of
sustainable livelihoods.
7Note that Gaventa separates capital into four categories - human, environmental (which I call natural
capital), economic and social.
5knowledge of this author). To the extent that it facilitates the acquisition of skills and
knowledge, however, it can play an important role in developing human capital.
Economic capital refers to the sum total of all of one’s material possessions
and investments, which can be converted into economic resources (money). One can
use economic capital to acquire other forms of capital, including human capital
(labour and knowledge), social capital (loyalty, networks) and natural capital (water,
land). Likewise, one can use human capital to acquire economic, social and natural
capital, and so on. An important point here is that one form of capital can be used to
acquire other forms of capital.
Sources of Environmental Change
Sustainable livelihoods are also about change. Two distinctions are
particularly relevant to this discussion. One is the distinction between natural and
human-induced environmental change. Another is the distinction between exogenous
and endogenous change. Natural environmental change simply implies that a
transformation in the quantity or quality of resources (natural or social) is due to
forces beyond human action or control. These changes are often referred to as ‘acts of
God’. In contrast, human-induced environmental change refers to transformations
caused by social activities or processes.8
Exogenous change implies that a change is due to actions and processes which
are beyond the control of a particular community. ‘Community’ simply refers to a
group of individuals who share a common interest (which is explored in greater detail
below). Correspondingly, endogenous change indicates changes that are due to
processes and activities within the control of a particular community (Mearns, 1996a:
113). In so far as community and “common interests” are influenced by subjective
preferences, perception plays a large (but not exclusive) role in the distinction
between exogenous and endogenous change.
Natural resources are either renewable or non-renewable. Renewable resources
imply a stock or flow of inputs, which, when used, can be replenished at a later point
in time. An important element here is that the conversion from renewable capital to
renewable resources is a temporary, reversible process. Utilisation of non-renewable
resources, however, suggests a relatively permanent, irreversible process, or, if not
                                                
8Of course, the distinction between natural and human-induced environmental change is often blurred
by contradictions between knowledge (what is true) and perception (what one believes is true). Indeed,
one could argue that competing perceptions of natural versus human-induced environmental change lie
at the heart of many environmental debates.
6permanent, one in which the time required to replenish capital and/or resources
exceeds an individual’s discount rate (Nostrum, 1990: 35).
The scale of environmental change can be measured in terms of duration and
magnitude. Duration simply refers to the time that elapses between the onset and
termination of environmental change.9 Magnitude entails three basic elements. One is
the total geographic area affected by the environmental change. A second is the
change in the actual quantity of resources. A third element is a transformation in the
quality of a resource (i.e. its capacity to serve an individual’s particular need) (Blaikie
and Brookfield, 1987: 6-14).
Implicit here is a distinction between direct and indirect interests. As Ostrom
(1990: 30-32) argues, a resource base represents a public good,10 which one can
choose to maintain, and from which one can extract private benefits (resource units).
Interests are direct, then, when one’s capacity to meet one’s livelihood needs is
directly related to the health and longevity of the resource base (i.e. its capacity to
provide benefits; Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987: 6-10). Interests are indirect, however,
when an individual’s ability to meet one’s livelihood does not depend upon the well-
being of the resource base.11
Insurance and Response
Finally, sustainable livelihoods are about the ways in which individuals
prepare for and respond to the effects of environmental change. Davies (Forthcoming:
4-6) distinguishes between livelihood and subsistence strategies, both of which
individuals pursue during times of relative security. Livelihood strategies, she argues,
“imply relative success,” in the sense that they “make people more secure and can
lead to positive adaptation,” (i.e. reversible strategies which are pursued by choice).
Subsistence strategies “imply relative failure,” in the sense that they “result in greater
vulnerability, necessitate the pursuit of negative adaptation, and are followed by the
poor alone,” (Forthcoming: 5).
                                                
9Although, as Scoones (1994) argues, this is not to suggest that environmental conditions reach and
maintain “optimal” equilibria.
10Goods or services which, when consumed by a group member, cannot be feasibly withheld from
other members of the group Olson (1965: 14). Also see Keohane and Ostrom, (1995: 3-14).
11This is not to suggest that individuals with indirect resource interests do not have direct resource
interests of their own. A European with an indirect interest in the health and longevity of rainforests in
Southeast Asia, for instance, can easily have direct resource interests. Resource interests vary in the
sense that individuals possess different “preference intensities,” which can vary over time, space and/or
socio-economic status (Martin, 1995: 73).
7Returning to the distinction between resources and capital, this
conceptualisation suggests that livelihood strategies enable individuals to increase
security by accumulating and investing in various forms of capital. Subsistence
strategies are more likely to deplete capital, however, perpetuating a situation in
which scarce resources are always being “used,” leaving little margin for
accumulation. Livelihoods are sustainable, then, when they promote an accumulation
of all forms of capital .
Implicit in Davies’ model is a distinction between ex ante and ex post coping
strategies. The former she refers to as “insurance strategies,” which are “undertaken
prior to the onset of a crisis, but in the expectation that it will happen,” (Forthcoming:
4). To this set of intentional insurance strategies, I would add another set of non-
intentional insurance strategies, which are not necessarily pursued as a way of coping
with crisis, but which nonetheless function to facilitate the coping process.
Secondly, sustainable livelihoods are measured in terms of an individual or
community’s capacity to respond to crisis. As noted earlier, Davies distinguishes
between positive and negative adaptation strategies. “Positive adaptation,” she
argues,
'is by choice, can be reversed if fortunes change and usually leads to increased
security and sometimes wealth. It is concerned with risk reduction and likely
to be an intensification of existing livelihood strategies; or diversification into
neighbouring livelihood systems, (1996: 5)
Negative adaptation is of necessity, tends to be irreversible and frequently
fails to contribute to a lasting reduction in vulnerability. Negative adaptation
occurs when the poor are forced to adapt their livelihoods because they can no
longer cope with short-term shocks and need to fundamentally alter the ways
in which they subsist' (Forthcoming: 5).
The pursuit of sustainable livelihoods becomes problematic when one assumes
that individuals prefer to maximise their own resources (and those of individuals
towards whom they are altruistic), and that finding and obtaining resources can be
costly. In so far as one’s human and economic resources depend upon the quantity and
quality of natural resources, sustainable resource management constitutes a significant
collective dilemma.
A central element here is uncertainty, and the ways in which individuals deal
with uncertainty. To the extent that human-induced and natural environmental
changes are unpredictable (Scoones, 1994), the pursuit of livelihood entails a
substantial degree of risk (i.e. one does not know whether and to what extent one’s
investment of capital and/or labour will sustain the natural resource base; see below).
8To the degree that rules represent “guides to future courses of action,” (Knight, 1992:
67), social institutions, particularly ones relating to property and entitlements, play an
important role in reducing uncertainty about the actions of others.
III. Property, Entitlement and Social Exclusion
Property is a claim that an individual asserts over a stream of benefits
(Bromley, 1992: 4; Pearce and Warford, 1993: 245). One’s capacity to capture a
resource depends in part upon the degree to which others agree to respect this claim.
Property rights facilitate this process by specifying the conditions under which
individuals can lay claim over particular resources (Coleman, 1990: 33-40). Formal or
informal (see below), a property right simply implies a claim on property that others
(either with or without the enforcement of a third party) will agree to uphold
(Bromley, 1992: 4).
An important point about property is that it represents a resource in which
individuals have an interest, and over which they seek control. One’s capacity to
control the distribution of a resource depends upon the extent of one’s endowments
and entitlements. Endowments are an individual’s legitimate command over a
particular resource. Entitlements are the benefits one derives from using these
endowments (Devereux, 1996; Gore, 1993; Mearns, 1996c). If a piece of land
represents one’s endowments, then, the benefits one derives from raising cattle
constitute one’s entitlements (Devereux, 1996: 13). Both of these factors depend upon
norms of legitimacy (i.e. what constitutes “legitimate command”),12 which are
reinforced by formal and informal institutions.
As Gore (1993: 442-3) and Devereux (1996: 4-5) argue, however, “legitimate
command” is rarely absolute or uncontested. Instead, one’s command over property
varies with one’s capabilities (human, economic and social capital) and the
“excludability” of the resource (Robin Mearns, personal discussions; Mearns, 1996c).
Access, admission and priority to a particular entitlement can also depend upon one’s
capacity and one’s willingness to follow a particular social rule. As Devereux (1996:
10) argues, individuals can have ownership, control, access and influence over a
particular resource (Devereux, 1996: 10). Ownership, he argues, implies a right to use
and benefit from a resource, a right to rent and sell the resource to others, and a right
to exclude others from enjoying its benefits or reducing its value (Devereux, 1996:
10).
                                                
12See Gore (1993: 440-1) for a broader review of Sen’s moral critique of utilitarianism and liberty.
9Exchange and Power
In theory, then, ownership implies perfect divisibility and zero externalities
(Coleman, 1990: 34). To the degree that control, access and influence imply the
existence of externalities (i.e. unlike ownership, they are not absolute), they also
imply the importance of power. Once again, it is important to stress that a social
relationship entails an actor with an interest over which another actor has control
(Coleman, 1990: 47-58). Interest here implies that an individual places value on a
resource, or stock of resources (capital).
Coleman (1990: 45-8) argues that individuals can obtain control, access or
influence over a resource in which they have an interest by relinquishing other
resources over which they have influence, access or control. In many instances, they
undertake this process by temporarily vesting a right to control their resources (and
their actions) in the hands of another party (Coleman, 1990: 45-8). This type of
arrangement implies a social exchange. Examples here would include exchanges of
labour (human resources) for money (economic resources/capital), money for land
(natural/economic resources) and friendship for loyalty (social capital).
In other situations, individuals are forced to relinquish their rights over a
particular resource in order to pursue an activity or resource in which they have no
interest. This type of arrangement implies a power relationship. Power here is
exercised when one individual induces another to act against his or her own interest
(Coleman, 1990; Giddens, 1979; Knight, 1992). As Knight (1992: 42) argues, the
importance of power relates to the fact that certain individuals can develop and use
social institutions to get others to act in ways which suit or satisfy their own
preferences.
The legitimacy of any social relationship (and the authority it confers) depends
upon the degree to which individuals can choose to vest and/or withdraw the right to
control their behaviour. Coleman (1990: 172) calls this the “internal morality” of a
social system. As he states, “internal morality is absent when individuals are unable to
recover actual control over their actions by withdrawing rights of control through use
of institutions within the system of authority,” (1990: 173, emphasis added). An
absence of internal morality, then, implies that the institutions on which a relationship
is based undermine the interests of one or more of its participants. It is this violation
that fosters, and indeed legitimates, the pursuit of “unruly social practices,” (Gore,
1993: 447).13
                                                
13Of course, internal morality is relative in the sense that it stems from the subjective preferences of the
individuals who wish to withdraw from the relationship.
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Unless one is able to exclude others perfectly from one’s capital and resources
(i.e. unless one’s capital and resources are absolutely private),14 one may be subject to
the power of others. However, one’s control, access and influence over ones’ own
resources, and the resources of others, may temper this influence.
Authority, Exclusion and Property Regimes
The importance of conceptualising power in this way is that it clarifies the
nature of authority, and how authority affects the operationalisation of different
property regimes. Authority here refers to a relationship in which an individual
legitimately exercises power over another social actor. As Coleman (1990: 66) argues,
it implies a “right to control another’s actions.” Once again, legitimacy depends upon
prevailing social norms, which are reinforced by formal and informal social
institutions. Autonomy indicates the degree to which one can exercise authority
without hindrance from external, competing forms of authority.
Four types of property regime are particularly relevant to this discussion: open
access resources (OARs), private property regimes (PPRs), state property regimes
(SPRs) and common property regimes (CPRs). Open access resources are essentially
natural resources without property rights (Bromley, 1992: 4; Libecap, 1995: 162-64;
Devereux, 1996: 11). As such, they lack rules prescribing or proscribing who can or
cannot gain access. Private property regimes are at the other end of the spectrum,
suggesting absolute divisibility and excludability. Most PPRs are actually relative
PPRs in the sense that resources are not absolutely divisible or excludable, but they
are treated as if  they were by formal and informal institutions.
In private property regimes, rights are conferred onto individuals or firms
(organisations of individuals, working together to maximise monetary return in a
market exchange), giving them the authority to exclude non-members and to decide
the institutions that govern relationships within and among competing regimes
(Pearce and Warford, 1993: 245-50; E.Ostrom et al, 1994: 7; Blaikie and Brookfield,
1987: 186). State property regimes are similar to PPRs in the sense that they are also
divisible and excludable (Devereux, 1996: 11). Exclusion in SPRs is facilitated by the
fact that the “owner” and the “enforcer” are theoretically the same entity. Because
states also provide public goods, however, SPRs can be common property regimes
and open access resources, depending on the rules the state decides to put in place.
Examples here would include public parks (a CPR) and abandoned, state-owned land
(an OAR).
                                                
14Note that recognition and enforcement by the state do not guarantee absolute privacy.
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Common property resources are essentially depletable public goods. They are
common in the sense that the costs of exclusion are often too great for one party to
bear and utilisation can create social costs. Classic examples include waterways,
rangeland, unfenced forests and the greatest CPR of them all, air. CPR dilemmas arise
when utilisation diminishes the capacity of others to derive benefits from the resource
base (i.e. when it creates negative externalities: see below).
The primary distinction among private, state and common property regimes
rests on the terms of exclusion (often enforced by the rule of law). Private property
arrangements (and the membership they confer) are based on an exchange of
economic capital. Individuals may trade their labour or capital for the right to use a
private property resource, but authority (the final say regarding how the resource is
used) ultimately goes to the individual (or collectivity) who owns title to the resource.
State property arrangements often depend upon the decision making structure of the
state agencies responsible for the resource.15
Common property differs from state and private property in the sense that no
one can own or control the resource independently. Instead, given that everyone has
access to the resource, the best one can hope for is influence (Devereux, 1996). In so
far as they influence the activities of others, social institutions play an important role
in governing common property resources.
An important point about property is that it reflects a value over which
individuals can secure (an often imperfect) claim.  As Scoones (1996) argues,
however, natural and human-induced environmental change can affect the value that
individuals attach to property.  This feature can, in turn, affect choices regarding
property regime, institutional arrangement and levels of investment.  Regime type,
institutions and investment levels, Scoones asserts, tend to correspond directly with
the value that individuals place on a particular resource (1996:3).  Thus, low-value
resources, with "unstable and low production levels," tend to have open or common
property resource regimes, weak institutions and low levels of investment.  In
contrast, high-value resources, with stable and high production levels, tend to have
private or (small group) common property regimes, strong institutions and high levels
of investment (Scoones, 1996: 3).
What this implies is that individuals with minimal resources and capital will
be at a double disadvantage.  First, assuming that high-value economic and natural
resources entail higher costs than lower value resources, individuals with low levels
of social resources and capital will be less able to secure stable, high-production
                                                
15Note that individuals and groups of individuals can challenge the state’s authority over SPRs, and its
authority to recognise particular PPRs. Ostrom’s analysis (1990) suggests that it is this capacity
(facilitated by formal and informal institutions) which makes for enduring CPRs. See below.
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resources to pursue their livelihoods.  Indeed, evidence suggests that those with low
income levels often depend upon open access or "weak" common property regimes
for their livelihood (Devereux, 1996; Scoones, 1996; 1994; Mearns 1996a; 1996b;
1996c; Mackenzie, 1995; Jackson, 1995; Heyzer, 1995b; Oniang’o, 1995; Joekes,
1995; Swift, 1994; Bromley, 1992).  And, as Devereux (1996: 14) argues, even minor
entitlement or endowment changes can deprive these groups of access to vital
common property and/or open-access resources.
Second, assuming that one’s capacity to shape social institutions depends upon
the degree to which one can use resources and capital to satisfy one’s interests
(Knight, 1992), a lack of resources and capital appears to reinforce a condition of
"social disadvantage".  By virtue of their marginal status in society, the poor and
disadvantaged may have little capacity to influence the rules on which they depend for
access to economic and natural resources.
Both of these factors emphasise the importance of rules, and significantly, the
ways in which rules influence social behaviour.
IV. Rules, Norms and Sanctions
As noted in the Introduction, social institutions are rules which are socially
shared (Knight, 1992: 2-3; Ostrom, 1990: 51). In this respect, they differ from what
Knight refers to as “rules of thumb,” or rules that one uses to shape one’s own
behaviour (1992: 68). A central assumption here is that social institutions provide a
common meaning for those to whom they apply. Another common assumption is that
social institutions are both interpretable and unambiguous (Ostrom, 1990: 51). As
Knight states, many institutional theories assume that, “everyone knows the
applicability of the rules and that everyone knows that everyone knows, and so on,”
(1992: 75). Although this assumption creates a number of problems (see below), it
represents an essential starting point for any theory about rules and the ways in which
rules influence social behaviour.16 The value of assuming “perfect interpretation” is
that it provides a baseline from which one can explain observations which do not
conform to the original assumption (Knight, 1992: 16-8) .17
                                                
16Knight (1992: 76) proposes that individuals interpret rules and external behaviour by analysing i.
what other people say about their own intentions; and ii. how they have acted in the past.
17Note that Knight (1992) uses this argument to justify using an assumption of “narrow rationality,”
which this paper rejects in favour of the “broad” conceptualisation described earlier.
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A fundamental starting point for most institutional theories is that institutions
are not organisations. Douglass North’s clarification is reproduced widely in the
institutional literature:
Institutions are the rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, are the
humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are
composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, regulations), informal
constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour and self-imposed modes of
conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both.
Organisations are the players: groups of individuals bound by a common
purpose to achieve objectives. They include political bodies (political parties,
the senate, a city council, a regulatory agency); economic bodies (firms, trade
unions, family firms, cooperatives); social bodies (churches, clubs, athletic
associations); and educational bodies (schools, colleges, vocational training
centres) (parentheses in original; North, 1995: 23).
Social institutions, then, are the ties that bind individuals to organisations, regulating
intra- and inter-organisational behaviour.
A second clarification relates to the distinction between prescriptive and
proscriptive institutions (Coleman,18 1990: 245-8; Ostrom, 1990: 139; Mearns,
1996b; 1996c). Prescriptive institutions are rules that stipulate what an individual is
required or entitled to do (responsibilities and rights) or receive (rights and
entitlements), often using incentives (positive sanctions) to encourage particular forms
of behaviour. Proscriptive institutions stipulate what an individual cannot do, using
negative sanctions to penalise transgression. Information about sanctions matters
because it provides a rough guide about the choices facing other actors, and about the
implications of failing to comply with social rules (Knight, 1992: 54).
A final and important clarification relates to the distinction between formal
and informal institutions. As North argues, the fundamental distinction here “is one of
degree,” (1990: 46). Relatively speaking, formal institutions are the rules that any
figure of authority uses to shape a particular form of behaviour (Ostrom, 1990: 50-51;
North, 1990: 46-53; Knight, 1992: 171-3; Swift, 1994: 154; Levi, 1996: 48).
Examples of formal institutions in the United States would include a constitution, a
statute or a legal contract (North, 1990: 47). Examples of the Grameen Bank’s formal
institutions are rules that attempt to provide women with low-interest credit (Kabeer
and Subrahmanian, 1996).
                                                
18Note that Coleman uses these concepts to distinguish among different sets of norms, which are
contrasted with institutions below.
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Informal institutions, by contrast, are the rules that individuals use to shape
their own (social) behaviour (Ostrom, 1990: 51; Knight, 1992: 171-88; Swift, 1994:
154). Examples here would include an American Supreme Court judge’s
interpretation of the US Constitution (and the rules and sanctions that would
accompany it), a police officer’s enforcement of a traffic violation or the societal and
household rules that enable men to obtain credit intended for female clientele (Kabeer
and Subrahmanian, 1996). Informal rules, then, are the “working rules” (Ostrom,
1990: 51) that individuals use to shape their everyday behaviour.
Although they influence behaviour, informal institutions should not be
confused with norms, as they often are in the institutional literature (North, 1990: 36-
52; Uphoff, 1992: 4; Feeny, 1988: 171). Norms are preferences about how individuals
should act in a particular situation. Rules are stipulations about particular forms of
behaviour (which either conform or fail to conform to societal norms) with positive
and negative sanctions. As Knight (1992: 69) argues, rules require a “forward looking
quality” (“if you do this”) and sanctions to back it up (“this will happen”). Although
norms entail preferences about future behaviour and events, they lack the sanctions
that empower social rules. Stating that individuals should not cut down trees, for
instance, is a normative statement. Stipulating the conditions under which individuals
cannot cut down trees, and specifying the penalties for doing so, is a rule.19
An important point here is that individuals design and create formal rules in
order to influence informal rules and social behaviour (Knight, 1992: 171; North,
1990: 46-8; Coleman, 1990: 74; 243-66; Bates, 1995: 46-7; Giddens, 1979; Robin
Mearns and Melissa Leach, personal discussions). For every norm, Coleman  (1990:
260) argues, there exists a beneficiary (the party who expects to benefit from the
norm) and a target (one who is expected to comply). In some cases, the beneficiary
and the target are the same party, suggesting interdependence and mutual identity
(issues which are explored in greater detail below). In others, norms, and institutions
which influence norms, are designed to benefit a particular group of individuals. Their
capacity to do so depends upon their ability to shape the behaviour of the target
party.20
                                                
19Despite these differences, it should be stressed that rules and norms are highly interdependent. Rules
are important to norms in the sense that they provide a means through which a particular form of
behaviour can be encouraged and enforced. Likewise, norms are important to rules in the sense that
they influence the conditions under which particular institutions can arise, as North’s analysis of the
anti-slavery movement in the United States makes clear (1990: 84-7).
20Indeed, the most effective institutions are those that shape norms with little or no need for external
sanctions. In these circumstances, the norm is so fully internalised by the target that sanctions are
effectively unnecessary. Examples here would include the loyal employee who identifies with the firm
or the loyal spouse who identifies with the partner, often in spite of their own best interest (Coleman,
1990: 158-62).
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As Knight (1992: 171-88) and North (1990: 36-49) observe, however,
informal rules and social behaviour rarely conform with the stipulations of formal
institutions.21 Three factors can widen this disparity. First, information about the rule
and its sanctions may be false or misleading, encouraging inappropriate behaviour
(Knight, 1992: 185-6).22 Second, individuals may discount the probability of
detection and/or punishment. Finally, individuals may equate adherence with
unbearable costs, either for themselves or for those with whom they share interests.
Implicit here is an important distinction between ignorance and disobedience.
In the first instance, individuals fail to follow the letter of the law because they simply
do not know any better. In the latter two, they disobey the formal rules because they
believe that adherence will create unbearable costs, and/or they believe that the
benefits of disregarding the rules will outweigh costs of enforcement .
Systems of Sanction
Ignorance and disobedience, then, create wide-ranging costs for those
authorised and/or expected to uphold a particular rule. Three types of cost are
particularly important here. One is the cost of obtaining information about the
activities of the target audience. A second is the cost of transmitting information about
a particular rule or sanction. A final cost relates to the need to deliver negative or
positive sanctions when the rule is broken or followed.
As Coleman (1990: 278-85) argues, all three of these costs can vary with the
number of enforcers and the size and preferences of the target audience. “Incremental
sanctioning,” he argues, implies situations in which sanctions with relatively low
costs are implemented and enforced by a large number of people. “Heroic
sanctioning,” by contrast, implies that sanctions with relatively high costs are
implemented and enforced by a small number of “heroic” sanctioners (see Table I).
Table I.
Type of Sanction: Cost of Sanctions: Number of Sanctioners:
Incremental Low Many
Heroic High Few
                                                
21Failed attempts to “introduce” the US Constitution into selected Latin American societies being
useful cases in point (North, 1990: 100-03).
22Indeed, individuals may be entirely unaware of the rule’s existence.
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Incremental sanctions are effective when the costs of monitoring and enforcing
rules are sufficiently low and/or the perceived benefits of achieving conformity are
sufficiently high that large numbers of individuals will assume the costs of
sanctioning social rules. They also work well when individuals are able to
communicate effectively and efficiently. Effective, low-cost communication reduces
the costs of sanctioning in a number of ways. First, it enables individuals to assess the
ways in which others have acted in the past (Moore, 1990: 820-24; Coleman, 1990:
318-20; Putnam, 1993: 174). Second, it transmits information about the rules of the
game, reducing uncertainty about rules and future behaviour. Finally, it reveals
information about individual preferences, which enables social actors to develop
mutual interests.
In order to work effectively, however, communication requires a standard and
a medium through which individuals can accurately exchange opinions and
observations. Two low-cost variations of standard and medium are reputation and
gossip. As Moore (1994: 823) argues, reputation, and the means by which reputation
is defined, transmitted and used in society, provide “powerful self-interest imperatives
for honest dealing,” (also see Ostrom, 1995: 131-2; Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996: 9;
Coleman, 1990: 319-20; Putnam, 1993: 174). To the extent that “word of mouth”
transmits information about past behaviour, rules and intentions, it provides
individuals with a low cost means of monitoring and enforcing social institutions.
In so far as individuals identify with the pursuit of a particular norm, mutual
interests reduce the costs of (and the need for) monitoring the behaviour of others
(Coleman, 1990: 243-4). If two people “identify” with the notion that people should
not drink and drive, for instance, neither has to work very hard to ensure that the other
follows the social rules that apply to this norm. Identification also perpetuates
sanctions which encourage the pursuit of and adherence to a common norm. To the
degree that individuals are satisfied by the same outcome, each has an incentive to
reward others for working toward its realisation (Coleman, 1990: 274).
Effective communication also serves as a means by which individuals can
“close” social networks of engagement. Closure here implies that individuals are tied
to one another in some way.23 Closure is important because it provides a way of
binding individuals to others, and to the consequences of their actions. In so doing, it
reduces one’s capacity to escape the effects and implementation of social sanctions
                                                
23Note that closure is closely related to the concept of “embeddedness,” which implies the degree to
which individuals and actions are situated within a particular network of relations. See Coleman (citing
Granovetter, 1990: 302); Putnam (1993: 172); Tendler and Freedheim (1994: 1774); P.Evans (1996b:
1120).
17
(Kerkvliet, 1990: 267-8; Hirschman, 1978; Glance and Huberman, 1994; Ostrom et
al, 1994: 167; Putnam, 1993: 174-90; Coleman, 1990: 318).24
Cooperation and Trust
Incremental sanctions work most effectively, then, when information about the
behaviour and intentions of others is relatively widespread (North, 1990: 55-58).
Problems arise, however, when information is less forthcoming. As interactions over
time and space increase, so do the costs of obtaining relevant information, creating
broad scope for opportunistic behaviour (North, 1990: 58). As Toye argues,
’Unless the principal is perfectly informed at zero cost about the actions of the
agent, this relationship becomes problematic, in that the agent is given scope
for opportunistic behaviour which benefits himself or herself and usually also
reduces the welfare of the principal’ (Toye, 1995: 55).
When confronted with this situation, agents with privileged information have
one of two options. They can either take advantage of the situation, or act as though
the principal were fully informed about their activities. To the extent that experience
reinforces perception, the outcome of this decision has enormous bearing on future
decisions about behaviour and cooperation. In choosing the latter option, the agent
demonstrates a willingness and capacity to forego an opportunity to pursue personal
gain. Assuming that the principal interprets this to be a sacrifice, the decision to
forego opportunity generates a social obligation, which may be reciprocated. More
important, the decision satisfies and reinforces an expectation of trust.
A trusting relationship is important because it implies that the principal is
willing to make a “low personal investment in monitoring and enforcing the
compliance of the individual(s) with whom she has made a compact from which she
believes she will benefit,” (Levi, 1996: 47).25 To the extent that obligations generate
reciprocity (Coleman, 1990: 306; Ridley, citing Sahlins, 1996: 119), the decision to
forego opportunistic behaviour reinforces “the expectation that others will probably
follow the rules” (Putnam, 1993: 111).
An important point here is that relations of trust mitigate the need to monitor
and enforce each and every social arrangement (Putnam, 1993: 109-85; Levi, 1996:
47; Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996: 4-6; Coleman, 1990: 104). In so doing, they
                                                
24Note that closure also puts the “offender” at a distinct disadvantage vis-a-vis those who enforce the
rules. See below.
25See Coleman (1990: 104) and Humphrey and Schmitz (1996: 4) for similar definitions.
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liberate resources that would otherwise go towards the cost of monitoring and
enforcing social rules. This dividend is commonly referred to as “social capital”.26
Social capital provides value in the sense that it represents a stock of resources
that can be drawn upon to meet particular needs. A growing literature suggests that
trusting individuals can use social capital to provide a wide range of public goods,
including public infrastructure (Ostrom, 1995; Ostrom et al, 1994a), healthcare
(Tendler and Freedheim, 1994), education (Ostrom, 1996) and effective democracies
(Putnam, 1993; Fox, 1996; Heller, 1996; Levi, 1996). Clearly, the implications for
environmental management are large, and are explored in due course.
Defection and Distrust
For the time-being, however, the second option in the principal-agent dilemma
requires further scrutiny. Assuming that individuals are somewhat less socially-
inclined, what happens when the agent chooses to defect? Implicit in the foregoing
discussion is an assumption that trustworthy individuals (i.e. those who do not defect)
value the benefits of future interaction. In other words, their discount rate is relatively
low (Ostrom, 1990: 35-7). Game theory and historical observation suggest that
discount rates will remain low as long as individuals believe that they may need to
interact with those from whom they could defect at some point in the future (see
Glance and Huberman, 1994; Ostrom et al, 1994; 1994a; Blomquist et al, 1994; Levi,
citing Sugden, 1996: 47).
A necessary condition here is that individuals believe that their well-being
depends upon future interaction with those from whom they receive trust. In other
words, trust is more forthcoming when individuals perceive interdependence27
(Ostrom, 1990; Putnam, 1993; Libecap, 1995; White and Runge, 1995; Keohane and
Ostrom, 1995). A central point about interdependence is that it lowers the discount
rate and facilitates cooperation. Problems arise, however, when individuals believe
that the benefits derived from short-term gain outweigh the costs of future non-
cooperation. Individuals can pursue short-term opportunities in two particular ways.
                                                
26See Coleman (1990); Putnam (1993); Levi (1996); Steer et al (1996); Fox (1996); Ostrom (1990;
1995; 1996); Ostrom et al (1994a); Mearns (1996b); P.Evans (1996a; 1996b); Heller (1996); Gaventa
(1996); Goldberg (1996); for other variations on the role of trust, see Wade (1988b); Oakerson (1988);
Tendler and Freedheim (1994); Moore (1994); Humphrey and Schmitz (1996); Ridley (1996).
27Knight (citing Elster, 1992: 17) identifies three forms of interdependence: i. a relationship in which
the benefits of each depend upon the benefits of all; ii. one in which the benefits of each depend upon
the choice of all; and iii. one in which the choice of each depends upon the choice of all. Coleman
(citing Friedman, 1990: 30) distinguishes between these forms of interdependence (which he calls
“structural interdependence”) and “behavioral interdependence,” in which the actions of individuals are
conditional upon the actions of others at a prior moment in time.
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First, as the principal-agent dilemma suggests, they can do so when information about
their activities is fully or partially concealed from those from whom they would
extract rent (North, 1990: 74; Toye, 1995: 55). In these instances, individuals are free
to use their own informal rules of engagement, because they are effectively “shielded”
from the formal sanctions of others.
A second way in which individuals can pursue short-term gain at the expense
of others is by structuring the formal and/or informal rules in a way that suits their
particular interests. Assuming that individuals possess the necessary information and
skills to pursue the institutional arrangements they believe will best meet their
preferences, it is reasonable to assert that access to and control over institutions may
reflect the asymmetrical distribution of power in a particular social setting (Berry,
1989; Bates, 1995; 1988; Mearns, 1996c; Gore, 1993). Examples here would include
irrigators who use their close proximity to a reservoir to appropriate excessive shares
of water, or polluters who transfer negative externalities onto downstream consumers.
In each case, the tail-enders have strong incentives to negotiate institutional
arrangements that would encourage top-enders to constrain their activities (Ostrom,
1995: 139-43). Given their poor geographical and/or socio-economic status, however,
their capacity to do so will be significantly constrained.28
The implication here is that neutral enforcement of any activity is effectively a
public good, subject to problems of opportunism, free-riding and political persuasion
(Putnam, 1993: 165; North, 1990: 58; Knight, 1992: 171-96; Ostrom, 1990: 42-3). As
the foregoing discussion suggests, individuals will follow their own rules when
discount rates are sufficiently low to generate perceptions of interdependence. Self-
enforcement breaks down, however, when discount rates exceed the benefits
individuals believe they derive from adhering to the rules (North, 1990: 55). It is
under these circumstances that informal rules and patterns of behaviour deviate from
the stipulations that constitute formal institutions.
In so far as formal rules are associated with personal benefits, individuals have
strong incentives to ensure that these rules are followed (Knight, 1992: 188-9; North,
1990: 46-7). The costs of enforcing adherence, however, are often well beyond the
resources and capabilities of any single interest group in society (interest groups being
a “self-identified” set of individuals sharing an interest in the pursuit of a common
norm; Uphoff, 1992: 5). Unable to trust one another, interest groups turn to third
parties to monitor and enforce formal rules in society (Ostrom, 1990: 41-2). As
Knight argues,
                                                
28Unless they have something the head-enders need; ie. labour, capital, other valuable resources;
(Ostrom, 1995: 139-40).
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’The logic of informal institutionalization is to constrain the actions of others
through our own commitments. The logic of formal institutionalization is to
constrain the actions of others through the actions of a third party’ (1992: 188).
Enter the heroic sanctioner. An important assumption here is that heroes
possess physical and/or administrative qualities that enable them to assume the costs
of high-cost enforcement. Given their monopoly on administrative resources, and on
the use of force, nation-states are often well-suited to meet the demands of heroic
sanctioning.29 In particular, legislatures, judiciaries, militaries and other agencies of
control can use this monopoly to define, monitor and enforce formal institutional
arrangements (Ostrom, 1990: 41; North, 1990: Chapter 7).
Heroes are aided in their cause by the “moral support” of those who feel they
have an interest in an activity which the sanctioner is trying to encourage or
discourage (Coleman, 1990: 283). Moral support enables heroic sanctioners to
overcome what Coleman refers to as the “second order public good problem” of social
sanctioning (1990: 283). This simply refers to the challenge of inducing heroic
sanctioners to bear the costs of enforcing norms which create particular benefits.30 An
essential requirement here is that the sanctioner possess “a presumptive right to
impose the sanction,” (Coleman, 1990: 283). In other words, the second order public
goods problem diminishes when sanctioners presume that what they are doing is
“right.”
As Knight (1992: 181-92) and North (1990: 49) argue, however, norms about
“what is right” vary widely within any social setting, producing contradictory
preferences about the normative direction of formal rules. To the extent that nation-
states monitor and enforce formal rules, formalisation entails a process in which
informal rules are transformed into formal rules, backed by the coercive power of the
nation-state. It is the struggle over what constitutes a formal rule, Knight (1992: 188)
argues, that represents “the basic politics of state decision making.”
A Theory of Institutional Conflict
A danger with both incremental and heroic sanctioning is that individuals may
be encouraged to pursue norms which are not in their interest. In other words, they
may be forced to pursue norms from which they do not receive benefits. Although the
                                                
29See Ostrom, 1990: 41; Swift, 1994: 154; 1993: 7-9; Martin, 1995: 76-7; Kurien, 1992: 222;
Oakerson, 1988: 153-4; North, 1990: Chapter 7; 120-21; Young, 1995: 31; Feeny, 1988: 168-70;
Vivian, 1992: 61; Mearns, 1996a: 125-6; Knight, 1992: 171-92.
30
“First order” public good problems refer to the challenge of inducing individuals to follow a norm
(Coleman, 1990: 280-4).
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very existence of a sanction suggests that individuals do not identify fully with the
norm, the danger here is that social institutions actually encourage individuals to
undermine their own interests. This can happen in two ways. First, incremental
sanctions may perpetuate “destructive fads,” norms which appear attractive, but
actually contradict the interests of those who follow them (Ridley, 1996: 182-3;
Coleman, 1990: 198-201). Second, heroic sanctions may enforce formal rules from
which adherents receive little or no tangible benefits, and from which they have no
formal means of escape (Bates, 1988: 390-95; North, 1995: 21).
A fundamental concern here is that formal rules generate situations in which
positive externalities go to those who do not bear the costs, and negative externalities
go to those who do not enjoy the benefits. A secondary concern is that formal rules
and sanctions “trap” individuals within harmful social arrangements. As noted earlier,
exchange relationships become power relationships when one party contributes
resources to an activity in which he or she has no particular interest. Social
relationships lack “internal morality,” Coleman (1990: 172-3) argues, when the
institutions that structure the relationship prevent members from leaving the
relationship. An example of an immoral formal institution, then, would be a
constitution that fails to provide rules for secession.
Conflicts arise when formal rules encourage individuals to act in ways that
contradict their expectations and preferences (Knight, 1992: 185). Implicit conflict
appears when individuals seek to leave an immoral relationship, but immoral
institutions and/or immoral actors (i.e. individuals who ignore “moral” institutions)
prevent them from doing so. Explicit conflict (or overt resistance) occurs when
individuals attempt to change this situation .
Individuals can “resist” immoral power relationships in one of two ways. First,
they can withhold the right to control the actions and resources they contribute to the
relationship (Coleman, 1990: 172-3; Kabeer, 1994: 127-28; Kerkvliet, 1990: 260-8).
Examples here would include strikes or civil disobedience (Scott, 1985). As Kabeer
(1994: 127-30) and Kerkvliet (1990: 260) observe, however, an ability to withhold
resources requires access to resources and allies outside of an immoral relationship.
An inability to reach these vital resources greatly reduces the prospects for effective
resistance. In households where men monopolise assets and relationships with
external actors, for instance, women are often forced to “cooperate” simply in order to
survive (Kabeer, 1994: 128).
 A second way in which individuals can resist immoral relationships, then, is
to seek the aide of “moral allies.” Moral alliances are important because they provide
a means through which individuals can leave immoral relationships (Hirschman,
1978). As Coleman argues, target actors can disregard a social rule if they have
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“sufficient mobility to escape the effect of sanctions,” (1990: 286). Individuals can
challenge undesirable norms and institutions by collaborating “with others outside
who are not norm holders,” (Coleman, 1990: 286). Hart’s analysis of Malaysian
households, for instance, suggests that women were able to challenge male authority,
in both the workplace and the household, by joining forces with other women in
female agricultural work gangs31 (cited in Kabeer, 1994: 121).
Moral allies also aide their beneficiaries by reducing the costs of resisting the
status quo. One cost is the cost of encouraging individuals to pursue collective goals
(Knight, 1992: 196). In so far as individuals seek to satisfy their own interests, they
may be disinclined to participate in a collective effort if they believe that the costs of
participating will outweigh the ultimate reward (Olson, 1965: 27-33; Ostrom, 1990:
44-45; Coleman, 1990: 53). “Political entrepreneurs” (those who assume the costs of
motivating collective efforts), then, must use positive and negative sanctions to induce
members to pursue collective interests (Olson, 1965: 27-33; Ostrom, 1990: 40;
Mearns, 1996a: 125). One powerful inducement is the nature of the challenge, which
entails a “normative assertion that the present situation is either inefficient, unfair, or
both,” (White and Runge, 1995: 1685). To the extent that individuals identify with a
collective challenge, they possess strong incentives to ensure its achievement.
A second cost relates to the importance of obtaining and transmitting
information about the collective task at hand (White and Runge, 1995: 1690; Mearns,
1996a: 125). Included here are the costs of searching out opportunities, monitoring
collective activities, negotiating with potential adversaries, and in general, obtaining
information about “what needs to be done.” Finally, moral allies can help their
beneficiaries by assuming or reducing the political costs of challenging the status quo
(Khan, 1995). Effectiveness here depends upon the moral ally’s capacity to shield its
beneficiary from retaliation from those who would seek to maintain the status quo,
and on its ability to bargain on behalf of the beneficiary. Along with organisational
and informational costs, bargaining costs include the costs of engaging and
challenging those who possess the authority to change the status quo (Knight, 1992:
181; Mearns, 1996a: 125; Stewart, 1996: 18).
Individuals will invest in these “social,” and “political resources” when they
perceive that their interests will best be served by making the investment (Kabeer,
citing Guyer, 1994: 121; Berry, 1989: 41-51; Coleman, 1990: 286-8). Three factors
can constrain their capacity to make this investment, however. First, individuals may
lack the time or resources to invest in social relationships. As Kabeer (1994: 127-30)
and Berry (1989: 49-51) argue, deepening economic poverty can in fact perpetuate
                                                
31Whose members, presumably, did not share the norms of their patriarchal superiors.
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social withdrawal, depleting any and all of the social resources that individuals have
at their disposal. Second, investors may lack access to or knowledge about the groups
from which they would seek support (which can create principal-agent dilemmas).
Finally, assuming that social investments entail economic and political costs, social
membership constitutes a significant public goods dilemma. As Berry (1989: 48)
argues, “if resources are fixed, increased membership implies less for each and may
reduce the fortunes of all.”
Two elements underlie this assertion. First, group expansion reduces the
payoff for individual investors, creating incentives to free ride (Olson, 1965: 16).
Second, as Berry argues,
'Investment in social relations as channels of access may divert surplus from
investment in directly productive activities, and direct the management of
production towards fostering loyalty rather than maximising physical output'
(1989: 49).
The dilemma here is twofold. First, investment in social relations can deplete other
resources. Second, the fruits of these investments are inherently difficult to capture
(Coleman, citing Loury, 1990: 315). Therefore, individuals have less incentive to
invest in relationships that are unlikely to produce private benefits.
A final concern is that the groups in which one invests may not pursue the
interests of their investors. “Good groups,” Stewart asserts, “raise efficiency while
generating a satisfactory (interpreted as equitable) distribution of the benefits, or
claims function that succeed in improving in improving the position of low-income
groups,” (1996: 15, parentheses in original). “Bad groups,” in contrast, achieve few
benefits or claims, and those which they do obtain generally go to “the richer elements
of the group,” (1996: 15). As she argues,
'The effectiveness of a claims group depends on the bargaining power they
acquire through forming a group. This is a matter of the objective
circumstances (e.g. whether there is much unemployed labour in the case of
workers’ organizations), and of their ability to use their organization
effectively (the discipline of the group and how confrontational they are
prepared to be)' (1996: 18; parentheses in original).
Once again, this raises the importance of the nation-state. The state occupies
an unusual position here in the sense that it can serve as both ally and adjudicator
(Knight, 1992: 192-4). Alliances form in two different ways. Interest-based alliances
form when states believe that they have an interest in the relationship.32 Constitutional
                                                
32Knight (1992: 190) offers a useful way of differentiating interests of the state. “Direct interests,” he
argues relate to the benefits that public officials receive from undertaking an intervention. Examples
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alliances, by contrast, arise from a formal obligation (backed by a formal rule) to
assist or protect a particular group in society (thereby creating rights).33
As noted earlier, states can reduce enforcement costs by monitoring and/or
enforcing formal rules (North, 1990: Chapter 7; Knight, 1992: 190). Given their
monopoly on financial and human resources in many societies, states can also
subsidise the organisational, informational and bargaining costs associated with
challenging the status quo (Ostrom, 1990: Chapter 4). Acting in this capacity, they can
provide an important forum in which competing interest groups can negotiate formal
and informal institutional change (Ostrom, 1990: Chapter 4; Knight, 1992: 192-94).
Of course, gaining access to the decision-making process is itself a significant
transaction cost, and is explored in greater detail below.
V. Common Pool Resource Theory
The importance of conceptualising rules, norms and sanctions in this way is
that it provides a distinction between cooperation (trust being a highly effective form
of cooperation) and conflict. The clarification is significant because it provides a
means of analysing and re-conceptualising the central propositions that underlie
common pool resource  (CPR) theory.34
A central concern of CPR theory is with the ways in which open access
regimes are transformed into common property regimes. The principal factor which
commonly prevents individuals from making this transition is the classic tragedy of
the commons scenario: how self-interested individuals are to restrict their use of a
resource (which is depletable) from which they are not easily excluded.35 Two
                                                                                                                                           
here would be salaries for police officers, bribes, etc. “Indirect interests” relate to the notion that the
state has an interest in perpetuating its own existence. Resonating strongly with the neo-marxist
perspective (see Evans et al., 1985), Knight argues that the state has an indirect interest in maintaining
economic stability to ensure a reliable supply of economic rent for itself, and for those on whom it
depends to remain in power.
33Of course, this raises the challenge of differentiating between state and societal interests, a challenge
that has plagued many a political theorist (Evans et al, 1985; Fox, 1996; Evans, 1996a; 1996b). For the
sake of theoretical clarity, an early assumption will be that the state has an interest in a relationship if it
is under no constitutional obligation to enter one, but does so nevertheless. The challenge of
determining what this interest is will depend upon the empirical nature of the intervention.
34See E.Ostrom (1996; 1995; 1990); Keohane and Ostrom (1995); E.Ostrom et al (1993; 1994);
Blomquist (1994); Blomquist et al (1994); Agrawal (1994); Lam (1996); Tang (1994); Libecap (1995);
Blaikie and Brookfield (1987); Martin (1995); Mitchell (1995); Opschoor and van der Straaten (1992);
Swift (1994; 1993); Wade (1988a; 1988b; 1992; 1995); White and Runge (1995); Mearns (1996a;
1996b; 1996c); Scoones (1996); Bromley (1992); Runge (1992); Uphoff (1992).
35Ostrom, 1990: 2-7; Ostrom et al, 1994: 7; Keohane and Ostrom, 1995: 13; Ostrom et al, 1993: 89.
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assumptions underlie this dilemma. First, rational individuals seek to maximise their
use of a resource because the benefits they believe they receive from doing so exceed
the marginal benefits of refraining in isolation. Second, without credible assurance
that voluntaristic behaviour will be reciprocated, individuals have strong incentives to
defect from collective arrangements. Fear of being taken for a “sucker,” then,
discourages collective action, producing a situation in which everyone seeks to
maximise personal benefit at the expense of others (Ostrom, 1990: 2-7; 43-45; Wade,
1988b: 490; Hardin, 1968).
CPR theory suggests that individuals can overcome the assurance dilemma,
and cooperate to protect a common pool resource, by designing and following rules
that most closely suit the environmental and socio-economic needs of the CPR
(Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al, 1993; 1994; Keohane and Ostrom, 1995; Wade, 1988a;
1988b; 1992; Mearns, 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; Swift, 1994; Devereux, 1996).
Successful regimes endure, CPR theory suggests, when the benefits derived from the
institutional regime (i.e. the rules, sanctions and means of enforcement) are confined
to “a smallish and stable community,” (Stewart, 1996: 16; Ostrom, 1990: Chapter 3).
One necessary condition is “credible commitment,” the expectation that pro-
social behaviour will be reciprocated (Ostrom, 1990: 42-45; White and Runge, 1995:
1692-93; Pearce and Warford, 1993: 246-47; Wade, 1988b: 489-90). Spatial
boundaries and temporal restrictions enhance credibility and assurance by stipulating
terms of exclusion, terms which are (ideally) decided, monitored and enforced by
those who use the resource (Ostrom, 1990: 90-6; Wade, 1992: 209-11; Tang, 1994;
Agrawal, 1994). A classic example here is an irrigation scheme in which farmers
monitor and enforce the activities of their own counterparts. Because they are literally
“next in line,” the temporary inspectors have strong incentives to undertake their role
effectively (Ostrom, 1990: 95-6).
Incremental sanctions and “mutual monitoring” (Ostrom, 1990: 45) reduce the
costs of generating and transmitting information about rules, preferences and the state
of the CPR (Ostrom, 1990: 45-6; Chapter 3; Runge, 1992: 33; Tang, 1994; Agrawal,
1994). In so doing, they narrow the gap between the “rules in use” and the “time and
place” needs of the CPR (Ostrom et al, citing von Hayek, 1993: 50). Included here are
factors such as local environmental conditions, local production activities, pre-
existing institutional arrangements, and levels of demand for a particular resource
(Lam, 1996: 1041; E.Ostrom et al, 1993: 90).
Effective communication regarding rules and reputations enable individuals to
learn from positive and negative experiences, developing rules when necessary and,
when possible, extending trust (Ostrom, 1990: 21; Chapters 3 and 4; 190-91; White
and Runge, 1995: 1691). In so far as the nation state (and the various departments
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within its authority) represents a source of formal institutions, CPR theory suggests
that individuals can transcend tragedy of the commons scenarios by exploiting
informal institutions that are already “on the ground,” (Ostrom, 1990: 190-91; Runge,
1992: 18; Uphoff, 1992: 4-5; White and Runge, 1995: 1693; Mearns, 1996a: 125).
What this suggests is that local institutional arrangements are themselves forms of
social capital, on which individuals can build broader and more complex ways of
accommodating preferences and settling disputes (Ostrom, 1990: 190-91; White and
Runge, 1995: 1693; Mearns, 1996b; 1996c).
Implicit here is an important distinction between “internal” and “external”
institutional dynamics (Ostrom, 1990: 21; Mearns, 1996a: 125-26). Internal dynamics
suggest that resource interests are direct, and networks of social interaction are local,
or “face-to-face,” (Uphoff, 1992: 4; Oakerson, 1988: 146; Ostrom, 1990: 138).
External dynamics, by contrast, imply that resource interests and social relationships
are relatively indirect, operating beyond the local level. Overwhelmingly, CPR theory
suggests, the health and longevity of any CPR depends upon the degree to which
interdependent individuals can recognise their interdependence, and maintain internal
institutions (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988a; 1992; Swift, 1994; Mearns, 1996a; 1996b;
1996c; Tang, 1994; Agrawal, 1994; Engberg-Pedersen, 1995; Lund, 1993; Vedeld,
1994; White and Runge, 1995).
As noted earlier, moral allies enable their beneficiaries to escape immoral
relationships by assuming organisational, informational and/or political costs of
initiating institutional change. In so far as they lower the costs of creating and
maintaining internal autonomy, moral allies are important to the health of the CPR.
Examples here would include local voluntary organisations (Ostrom, 1990: 137-8),
external non-governmental organisations (White and Runge, 1995: 1690) and
agencies of the state (Ostrom, 1990: Chapter 4; Wade, 1992: 224-5). Ostrom’s
analysis of water sharing arrangements in California, for instance, suggests that public
agencies provided a low-cost source of information (about the CPR), and a forum for
communication and conflict mediation (1990: 138).
Beyond providing information and mediating localised disputes, however,
central state agencies play a modest role in CPR theory. To the extent that they lower
the costs of maintaining or supporting internal institutions, external state authorities
can contribute to the well-being of a CPR. In terms of their capacity to design,
monitor and enforce formal institutions, however, external state agencies are
potentially disruptive (Ostrom, 1990: 157-82; White and Runge, 1995: 1693; Mearns,
1996a: 126; 1996b). The argument here is that central state officials lack the
understanding and wherewithal to regulate behaviour “across myriad micro
situations,” (Wade, 1988: 490; also see Ostrom, 1990: 157-82; Ostrom et al, 1993:
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50-90; Lam, 1996: 1041). For this reason, CPR theory suggests, internal institutional
regimes operate most effectively when they are left on their own .
A Critique of CPR Theory
The strength of CPR theory lies in its ability to recognise and conceptualise
the role of local actors and institutions. Challenging the deterministic notion that
individuals always “defect” from the commons, CPR theory suggests that given the
right social institutions, individuals will exercise restraint. In so doing, however, it
raises a number of problematic issues relating to power, autonomy and what
constitutes sustainable cooperation.
CPR theory rests on the assumption that individuals can interpret and respond
to an objectively-defined set of rules (i.e. individuals are rational). As Toye (1995: 59-
64) argues, however, it is not entirely reasonable to assume that individuals will
interpret, or follow, rules in a uniform fashion. Assuming bounded rationality,
individuals (including those who enforce the rules) may not share a common
understanding of what constitutes acceptable behaviour (White and Runge, 1995:
1693). Factor in assumptions of uncertainty,36 and the notion that individuals can
know and/or predict the effects of their actions becomes highly problematic (Robin
Mearns, personal discussions, 11 October, 1996). Common property regimes appear
to work well when the relationship between actions and outcomes is relatively direct.
Irrigation networks37 and community woodlots38 are classic examples. How CPRs
work when the resource serves many, potentially conflicting, interests (not necessarily
ones living in the area), however, is far less certain.
Assumptions of bounded rationality, then, raise the issue of opportunism. As
Toye (1995) argues, some parties follow rules better than others. And, more
important, some are better able to choose the rules they will follow (North, 1995: 23;
Ostrom et al, 1993: 326; Agrawal, 1994: 268; Knight, 1992: 177-96). Assuming that
skills and capabilities are distributed asymmetrically, and that monitoring and
enforcement are costly, the notion that individuals have the time and resources to
govern their own rules becomes problematic, suggesting a strong need for
representative enforcement. Only when the activities of the enforcer are absolutely
transparent, however, can a CPR work efficiently. When guardians possess specialist
                                                
36See, for instance, the literature on ecological disequilibrium; Scoones (1994).
37See Ostrom (1990); Lam (1996).
38See Tang (1994); Agrawal (1994).
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information and knowledge about their activities and the activities of resource users,
opportunities for defection arise (Bates, 1988: 394-98).
A second issue relates to the costs of achieving and maintaining internal
autonomy. Explanations for the emergence and evolution of CPR arrangements
suggest that individuals will negotiate new institutional arrangements when the
(perceived) benefits of change exceed the costs of maintaining the status quo (Ostrom,
1990: Chapter 4; 193-212; also see Ostrom et al, 1993: 46-50). Central here is the
notion that negotiating, implementing, using and re-negotiating rules of conduct entail
particular costs which individuals can ascertain in a rational manner. Institutional
change is more likely, Ostrom (1990: 211) asserts, when individuals share the
understanding that failure to change will affect all individuals equally and negatively
(also see White and Runge, 1995: 1693; Libecap, 1995: 188-89). Unless the costs of
inaction are readily apparent, however, individuals tend to discount their personal
stake in the equation, making this type of interdependence highly elusive (Ostrom,
1990: 208-9; Pearce and Warford, 1993: 211).
A central argument here is that CPR theory underpredicts the costs of
initiating and sustaining new and enduring institutional arrangements. Population
pressures, poor governance and market expansion can all place significant demands
on the resource claims of “smallish and stable” communities (Swift, 1993).39 CPR
theories appear to understate the costs of excluding or neutralising the effects of
external agents, particularly ones who migrate into the resource area or use its
resources from afar.40
As Oran Young (1995: 40) suggests, the principles on which CPRs appear to
thrive may be more empirical than the theorists suggest. CPRs, he argues, are initiated
and maintained by political processes, which may be highly contextual, and
inappropriate for different socio-cultural situations (Young, 1995: 41). Ostrom’s
theory of institutional change, for instance, extrapolates theoretical propositions from
a highly sophisticated process, involving district, state and supreme courts, and
constitutional rights that guarantee the freedom of speech, association, litigation and
access to information (1990: Chapter 4). Although it concedes that “rules are nested in
another set of rules that define how the first set of rules can be changed,” Ostrom’s
analysis (1990: 51) underpredicts the costs of changing institutions in less
accommodating socio-political conditions. As Fox argues, “social capital cannot be
                                                
39Although these variables are certainly not inevitably deterministic (see Fairhead and Leach, 1996;
Leach and Mearns, 1996; Forsyth, 1995).
40Examples of “absentee” resource users here would include foreign markets and urban centres; David
Satterthwaite, “Environmental Hazards in Third World Cities, and Options for their Regulation,” paper
presented at the Environmental Transformations in Developing Countries Conference. 16 October,
1996, Royal Geographical Society, London.
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assumed to be continuously distributed, especially where freedom of association is not
guaranteed,” (1996: 1091).
Indeed, enduring CPRs appear to depend upon powerful moral allies, who are
willing and able to assume the costs of maintaining or changing the status quo. One
important ally is the state. Assuming that internal and external pressures undermine
the autonomy of self-governing CPRs, “the right to exclude,” (Toye, 1995: 59) and
the state, which enforces this right, become vital (Vivian, 1992: 61-2). A central issue,
then, and one that CPR theories often neglect, is the way in which local institutional
arrangements achieve and maintain autonomy (Swift, 1994; Mearns, 1996a;
Oakerson, 1988). Evidence seems to suggest that CPRs can survive through periods of
“contestation,” although their survival either depends upon active state intervention or
international pressure (which induces state intervention) (Engberg-Pedersen, 1995;
Lund, 1993; Vedeld, 1994).
Thriving CPRs also depend upon the existence of non-state moral allies,
particularly ones with indirect interests in the CPR, and indirect relationships with its
members. As Ostrom (1990: 26) clarifies early on, her primary focus is on individuals
who depend “heavily” on the CPR for livelihood, intentionally exogenising the role of
indirect interests. Indirect interests receive little scrutiny in the CPR literature,
particularly with respect to the ways in which they reduce or assume the costs of
maintaining internal institutional autonomy.
A final criticism relates to the way in which conflict and cooperation are
conceptualised in CPR theory. At issue here is the degree to which trust and
cooperation can be generalised from selective networks of engagement into broader
categories of human interaction (Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996; Putnam, citing
Granovetter, 1993: 172). CPR theories suggest that the benefits derived from mutual
monitoring and incremental sanctions will be distributed evenly. Assuming social
asymmetry, however, this proposition raises a number of problematic issues. First, it
implies an assumption of abundance (i.e. that there are enough benefits to go around).
Second, the unequal power relationship raises a significant principal-agent dilemma.
Assuming that those who decide the distribution of a particular good represent the
agent, the principals have few means of obtaining the good or obtaining information
about the conditions under which the good is distributed (Bates, 1988; 1995). Finally,
empirical evidence appears to challenge the notion that when given the chance,
influential groups will not maximise rent at the expense of those less fortunate (Bates,
1989; Ostrom, 1990: Chapter 5; Bromley, 1992; Mearns, 1996b; Devereux, 1996).
Cooperation, CPR theory implies, simply suggests that everyone follows the
rules. Conceptualised in this way, CPR theory underpredicts the existence of implicit
conflict, and the potential for explicit conflict. In so far as uneven distribution creates
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losers, it implies the existence of implicit (if not explicit) conflict, a condition under
which individuals seek to leave a relationship, but are prevented from doing so. The
arrangements that Ostrom calls “successful CPRs” may lack explicit conflict, but this
certainly does not suggest they are conflict-free.
VI. Final Propositions and Conclusions
The foregoing discussion suggests two broad propositions about the conditions
under which common property regimes sustain collective resources, and the
livelihoods of those who use them. First, CPR theory suggests that rules should be
negotiated, monitored and enforced at the local level. In short, regulatory authority
should go to individuals within the CPR community (i.e. those with direct resource
interests). As the foregoing critique suggests, however, self-government does not
necessarily mitigate problems associated with powerful rent seekers, external threats
and institutional conflict. Although CPR theories suggest a way in which self-
governing regimes can reduce the gap between formal rules and the “time and place”
needs of the CPR, they fail to explain how commoners can overcome the costs of
addressing all three of these problems. A second proposition, then, is that enduring
and cooperative CPRs require active assistance from external moral allies.
 In so far as it specifies the nature of cooperation and conflict, the foregoing
discussion also provides a broad framework for the study of institutions and
sustainable livelihoods. As the following table indicates, sustainable and
unsustainable resource management can be differentiated by rates of rent dissipation
(i.e. the rate at which individuals extract benefits from the resource base).
Unsustainable conflict and cooperation both imply that rents exceed the natural
regenerative and/or assimilative capacity of the resource base, creating environmental
costs for all.
Table 2: Models of Unsustainable Cooperation and Conflict
Model: Rent dissipation: Distribution of benefits:
Cooperation High Wide
Conflict High Narrow
By contrast, sustainable conflict and cooperation imply that levels of rent dissipation
remain low, although the distribution of benefits may vary.
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Table 3: Models of Sustainable Cooperation and Conflict
Model: Levels of Rent Dissipation: Distribution of Benefits:
Cooperation Low Wide
Conflict Low Narrow
An important point here is that following the rules and maintaining a CPR are not
necessarily synonymous. Rules encourage the pursuit of sustainable livelihoods only
in so far as levels of rent dissipation remain low and distribution of benefits remains
wide. When rules reinforce narrow distributional patterns, however, livelihoods can
be profoundly unsustainable, irrespective of the physical state of the resource base.
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